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Abstract 
 
 
In recent years, there has been a growing scholarly interest in how International Relations theory can 
contribute to our understanding of the impact of technology on global politics, underpinned mainly by an 
engagement with Science and Technology Studies (STS). However, less attention has been paid to the ways 
in which international society shapes technology. Building on sociological and historical studies of science 
and technology, this article outlines one way through which international society has constituted technology 
by developing a synthetic account of the emergence of technological advancement as a ‘standard of 
civilisation’ in the nineteenth century that differentiated the ‘society of civilised states’ from non-European 
societies, with a particular focus on China and India. In doing so, this article also highlights how this process 
has had a powerful and enduring influence on Chinese and Indian conceptions about science and 
technology. Thus, by shifting the focus from how technology shapes global politics to how international 
society shapes technology, this article provides new insights into the relationship between technology, 
power, and modernity in an interdisciplinary context. It also offers a new way of thinking about the complex 
dynamics of today’s global politics of technology. 
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One of the key qualities of contemporary international society has been the role of 
technology and the subsequent transformation it has brought about in the conduct of 
international relations. It is not surprising, therefore, that there has been a burgeoning 
literature that deals with certain aspects of the global politics of technology, which has 
largely been organised around the examination of theoretical approaches to the study of 
current security issues and global governance challenges from an International Relations 
(IR) theory perspective.1  
   To be sure, the importance of technology has long been recognised by IR scholars. 
However, most scholars have been predominantly concerned with the material and 
strategic factors driving key technological projects. Furthermore, traditional IR 
approaches have offered accounts of the role of technology in global politics characterised 
largely by technological determinism and ahistoricism.2 Recent IR scholarship, by 
 
1 Examples are: Madeline Carr, ‘Power plays in global internet governance’, Millennium, 43:2 (2015), pp. 
640-59; Geoffrey L. Herrera, Technology and International Transformation: The Railroad, the Atom Bomb, 
and the Politics of Technological Change (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2006); Daniel H. 
Deudney, Bounding Power: Republican Security Theory from the Polis to the Global Village (Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007); Mary Manjikian, ‘Becoming Unmanned’,  International Feminist 
Journal of Politics, 16:1 (2014), pp. 48-65; Maximilian Mayer, Mariana Carpes, and Ruth Knoblich (eds), 
The Global Politics of Science and Technology - Vol. 1: Concepts from International Relations and Other 
Disciplines (Heidelberg: Springer, 2014); Columba Peoples, Justifying Ballistic Missile Defence: 
Technology, Security and Culture (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010). 
2 Daniel R. McCarthy, ‘Introduction: Technology in World Politics’, in Daniel R. McCarthy (ed.), 
Technology and World Politics: An Introduction, (London: Routledge, 2018), p. 2. For good overviews of 
the traditional IR approaches to technology, inter alia, see Madeline Carr, US Power and the Internet in 
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contrast, has paid attention to the relationship between power and technology, with a 
particular focus on how technology transforms international relations.3 Equally, there has 
been a growing interest in how technology is conditioned by social forces and political 
ideas, underpinned by an engagement with Science and Technology Studies (STS) 
generally, and with the Social Construction of Technology (SCOT) and Actor-Network 
Theory (ANT) in particular.4 
     While this literature helps us to appreciate the ways in which technology is shaped by 
the dynamics of social and political forces and how it affects international relations, 
limited attention has been paid to the ways in which international society shapes 
technology. Yet it is one of the central conceptual claims of the following discussion that 
to understand the interplay between technology and international relations, it is necessary 
to relate technology to the analytical idea of international society, associated with the 
 
International Relations (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016);  Stefan Fritsch, ‘Technology and global 
affairs’, International Studies Perspectives, 12:1 (2011), pp. 27-45; Herrera, Technology and International 
Transformation; and McCarthy, ‘Introduction’. 
3 Barry Buzan and George Lawson, The Global Transformation: History, Modernity and the Making of 
International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015); and Herrera, Technology and 
International Transformation.  
4 See, for example, Madeline Carr, US Power and the Internet; Herrera, Technology and International 
Transformation;  Fritsch, ‘Technology’; Maximilian Mayer and Michele Acuto, ‘The Global Governance 
of Large Technical Systems’, Millennium, 43:2 (2015), pp. 660–83; Daniel R. McCarthy, Power, 
Information Technology, and International Relations Theory (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015); 
Daniel R. McCarthy (ed.), Technology and World Politics: An Introduction (London: Routledge, 2018). 
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English School.5 The English School’s main concern is the rules, norms, and institutions 
that bound states as members of an international society, which is commonly 
differentiated from the international system. Significantly, within the English School 
perspective, institutions are not international governmental organisations, but ‘a set of 
habits and practices shaped towards the realisation of common goals’.6 By making this 
conceptual move of relating technology to the framework of international society, the 
article considers how a civilisation dimension was ascribed to the role of high technology 
that differentiated the ‘society of civilised states’ from non-European societies in the 
nineteenth century. This is an important, but largely overlooked, aspect of the growing 
literature on the global politics of technology, not least because this civilisation dimension 
has informed powerful and enduring conceptions of technology as markers of power, 
status, and modernity that still resonate today.   
 
5 Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics, (3rd edn, Basingstoke: Palgrave, 
2002. 
6 Bull, The Anarchical Society, p. 71. Bull identifies the balance of power, the managerial role of great 
powers, diplomacy, international law, and war as the key institutions of international society that underpin 
the maintenance of international order. It should be noted that Barry Buzan has introduced the terminology 
of primary institutions and secondary institutions to highlight the constitutive and fundamental nature of 
the former, which is employed in this article. See, Barry Buzan, From International to World Society? 
English School Theory and the Social Structure of Globalisation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2004). On the English School, inter alia, see Buzan, From International to World Society; Andrew Hurrell, 
On Global Order: Power, Values and the Constitution of International Society (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2007); Andrew Linklater and Hidemi Suganami, The English School of International Relations: A 
Contemporary Reassessment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Cornelia Navari and Daniel 
M. Green (eds.), Guide to the English School in International Studies (Chichester: Wiley Blackwell, 2014).  
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    More specifically, building on sociological and historical studies of science and 
technology, this article focuses on the emergence of ‘high-visibility technology’ as a 
‘standard of civilisation’ in the nineteenth century. In doing so, it examines how 
technology was increasingly seen as a measure of the level of civilisation in the nineteenth 
century, embedded in a techno-scientific orientalist discourse, what can be called ‘techno-
scientific orientalism’, which contributed to the construction of hierarchical conceptions 
of modern science and technology.7 As such, it was part of the wider orientalist discourse 
surrounding the construction of a series of binary oppositions between the European self 
and the non-European Other.8 The article then moves on to consider how this process has 
had a powerful and enduring impact on Chinese and Indian conceptions about science 
and technology.  
   The article, therefore, shares the view that one of the key aspects of the European 
expansion has been the ‘standard of civilisation’ based on an inner circle of Western 
‘core’ members, led by the European colonial powers, and a non-Western outer tier, and 
 
7 In this context, it is important to acknowledge that ideas about science, especially the appeal to nature in 
scientific aspects of civilisational standards were important along with ideas about technology. In many 
ways, then, technology emerged as the register through which scientific arguments about race were made. I 
would like to thank one anonymous reviewer for pointing this out. However, this article is primarily focused 
on ‘high-visibility technology’, which refers to the demonstrative effect of some technologies that allows 
for their celebration as great technological and engineering feats and consequently as a purported 
affirmation of self-proclaimed civilisational superiority and/or national technological prowess.  
8 Edward Said, Orientalism (New York, NY: Pantheon Books, 1978).  
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so it draws on debates about the relevance of the ‘standard of civilisation’ in 
understanding particular norms, practices, and institutions that have influenced 
international society since the nineteenth century.9 In this regard, it suggests that 
technological advancement went hand in hand with the construction of civilisational 
hierarchies and other standards of ‘civilisation’ in racialised terms by each feeding into 
the other. The article also shares many of the assumptions of the SCOT approach and its 
commitment to shedding light on the relationship between power and technology in the 
context of international relations.  
   This conceptual rethinking is important for a number of reasons. First, framing 
technology as a ‘standard of civilisation’ makes it possible to identify some of the 
shortcomings in the literature on technology and IR by shifting the focus from how 
technology shapes global politics to how international society has shaped technology, 
with enduring implications for today’s global politics of technology, as noted earlier. 
Indeed, as Daniel McCarthy notes, IR scholarship has paid much attention to the former, 
 
9 Gerrit W. Gong, The Standard of ‘Civilisation’ in International Society (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984). 
See also Brett Bowden, The Empire of Civilization: The Evolution of an Imperial Idea (Chicago, IL: 
University of Chicago Press, 2009); Barry Buzan, ‘The ‘Standard of Civilisation’ as an English School 
Concept, Millennium, 42:3 (2014), pp. 576-94; Edward Keene, Beyond the Anarchical Society: Grotius, 
Colonialism and Order in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); and Ann Towns, 
‘The status of women as a standard of ‘civilization’’, European Journal of International Relations, 15:4 
(2009), pp. 681-706. For an overview of the different uses of this concept, see Dimitrios Stroikos, 
‘Introduction: Rethinking the Standard(s) of Civilisation(s) in International Relations, Millennium, 42:3 
(2014), pp. 546-56. 
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but it has neglected the latter.10 Second, this rethinking also serves to illustrate how a 
historical-informed analysis helps to account for influential ideas about power and 
technology that inform the pursuit of key public technological projects, such as nuclear 
and space programmes, which define hierarchies and international social stratification in 
today’s international society.11 Most of these ideas, the article suggests, are rooted in the 
nineteenth century. Such a focus is also in line with recent works that have highlighted 
the impact of the ‘global transformation’ of the long nineteenth century on the current 
international order, especially with regards to the relationship between state, power, and 
modernity.12 Third, linking technology with the ‘expansion thesis’, and the cases of China 
and India in particular, helps not only to highlight continuities and discontinuities in the 
relationship between power and technology, but it also illuminates the agency of Chinese 
and Indian elites as part of a complex process of resisting, contesting, negotiating, and 
appropriating hegemonic conceptions of technology as sites of power. This is an 
 
10 McCarthy, ‘Conclusion: Technology and International Relations Theory’, in Daniel R. McCarthy (ed.), 
Technology and World Politics: An Introduction (London: Routledge, 2018), p.225. Notably, some work 
has been done from an English School perspective that deals with particular cases related to the politics of 
technology. For example, see William Walker, A Perpetual Menace: Nuclear Weapons and International 
Order (London: Routledge, 2012). See also Dimitrios Stroikos, Engineering world society? Scientists, 
internationalism, and the advent of the Space Age, International Politics, 55:1 (2018), pp. 73-90. But, to 
date, there has not been any effort to engage with the STS literature. 
11 Paul Musgrave and Daniel H. Nexon, ‘Defending Hierarchy from the Moon to the Indian Ocean: 
Symbolic Capital and Political Dominance in Early Modern China and the Cold War’, International 
Organization, 72:3 (2018), pp. 591–626. 
12 Buzan and Lawson, The Global Transformation; Jennifer Mitzen, Power in Concert: The Nineteenth 
Century Origins of Global Governance (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2013). 
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important consideration, given that China and India continue to prioritise technological 
prowess as emerging non-Western technological powers.13 
   What merits emphasis, for the purposes of this discussion, is that this article employs a 
broadened concept of technology. Clearly, conceptualising technology has presented 
knotty analytical challenges, especially when trying to make sense of the complex 
relationship between science and technology.14 One response has been to associate 
science with ‘amassing knowledge about and seeking understanding of the cosmos and 
the mundane world’, while the pursuit of technology has been seen as associated primarily 
with ‘solving practical problems and exerting control over nature’.15 However, this article 
shares Michael Adas’ view that such a distinction is unhelpful, given that the boundaries 
between scientific research and technology were becoming increasingly blurred from the 
nineteenth century onwards as a consequence of a new phase of industrial development.16 
 
13 Andrew B. Kennedy, ‘Powerhouses or pretenders? Debating China’s and India’s emergence as 
technological powers’, The Pacific Review, 28:2 (2015), pp. 281–302. 
14 I am aware that there is an ongoing debate within STS regarding the relationship between science and 
technology. For a good overview of this debate, see Paul Forman, ‘The primacy of science in modernity, 
of technology in postmodernity, and of ideology in the history of technology’, History and Technology, 
23:1-2 (2007), pp. 1-152. Also, see Sungook Hong, ‘Historiographical layers in the relationship between 
science and technology’, History and Technology, 15:4 (1999), pp. 289-311. Forman argues, rather 
controversially, that science became ‘subsumed under technology’ in the second half of the twentieth 
century.  
15 Michael Adas, Dominance by Design: Technological Imperatives and the America’s Civilizing Mission 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006), p. 12. 
16 Ibid, pp. 12-13. On this point, see also David F. Channell, A History of Technoscience: Erasing the 
Boundaries between Science and Technology (Abingdon: Routledge, 2017). 
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Significantly, this broadening of the concept helps to highlight how the operation of 
technology as a ‘standard of civilisation’ has been closely tied to other standards. For 
example, it speaks to those interested in the theoretical and empirical study of the 
construction of non-proliferation and arms control premised on civilisational practices 
and discourses that confine the possession of certain weapons to the club of ‘civilised’ 
countries, enmeshed in the logic of the ‘standard of civilisation’.17 Similarly, the 
argument is also relevant to the idea that the control of nature emerged as standard in the 
nineteenth century.18 Consequently, the central argument of this article enables us to ask 
a new series of crucial questions about the relationship between technology and 
international society: In what ways has the expansion of the European international 
society shaped powerful ideas about technology? What was the impact of the emergence 
of technology as a ‘standard of civilisation’ on China and India? What are the origins of 
techno-nationalism in international society? What explains the enduring relevance of 
 
17 Keith Krause  and Andrew Latham, ‘Constructing non‐proliferation and arms control: The norms of 
Western practice’, Contemporary Security Policy, 19:1 (1998), pp. 41-4; Richard Price, ‘A Genealogy of 
the Chemical Weapons Taboo’, International Organization, 49:1 (1995), pp. 73-103; Nina Tannenwald, 
‘The nuclear taboo: The United States and the normative basis of nuclear non-use’, International 
Organization, 53:3 (1999), p. 437. 
18 Joanne Yao, ‘‘Conquest from barbarism’: The Danube Commission, international order and the control 
of nature as a Standard of Civilization’, European Journal of International Relations, 25:2 (2019), 335-59. 
 
 
 
 
10 
conceptions of technology as a normative indicator of power, status, and modernity in 
China and India today?  
      The article is organised in the following way: The first part revisits the concept of the 
‘standard of civilisation’ and then moves on to review the ways in which technological 
achievements were represented as markers of the superiority of Western civilisation in 
the nineteenth century and how China and India were seen as ‘uncivilised’, based on 
European perceptions of their technological backwardness. The second part of the article 
then briefly considers how the social pressure created by the need to conform to the 
operation of technological advancement as a civilisational standard was one of the key 
drivers behind late Qing China’s technological modernisation. It also highlights some of 
the principal aspects of the nexus between science, technology, and modernity in British 
India and the Indian responses that this process elicited. The key point to emphasise here 
is how China and India’s encounter with the European international society and the 
construction of technological advancement as a ‘standard of civilisation’ informed, to 
varying degrees, the development of technology in China and India during that period as 
a normative marker of the state’s civilisation, power, and status. As we shall see, this 
conception of technological advancement still informs certain Chinese and Indian 
technological projects.   
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The ‘Standard of Civilisation’ 
 
One of the most important aspects of the modern structure of international society has 
been the expansion of the European international society into the non-European world 
and the subsequent great transformation of regulating international relations it brought 
about in the nineteenth century as a consequence. Although it is clear that a complex 
amalgam of factors played a decisive role in shaping the ways in which non-European 
states came to accept key European institutions, norms, and practices in the conduct of 
their international relations, for the purposes of this discussion, the important feature of 
this process has been the ‘standard of civilisation’, based on civilisational and racial 
hierarchies in a context of uneven and combined development.19 
   A detailed discussion of the evolution of the ‘standard of civilisation’ in international 
society is beyond the scope of this article, but the point to emphasise is that the underlying 
logic of the ‘standard of civilisation’ was evident in how the classification of ‘civilised’, 
‘barbarian’, and ‘savages’ was used by international lawyers as three categories 
consistent with different stages of legal recognition. A key dimension of the operation of 
 
19 Buzan, ‘The ‘Standard of Civilisation’’; Gong, The Standard of ‘Civilisation’. On the ‘standard of 
civilisation’ and uneven and combined development see, Buzan and Lawson, The Global Transformation; 
and Alex Anievas and Kerem Nisancioglu, How the West Came to Rule: The Geopolitical Origins of 
Capitalism (London: Pluto Press, 2015), pp. 127, 134.  
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the ‘standard of civilisation’ as a legal principle, therefore, was that those political entities 
aspiring to be brought within the confines of the perceived international society of 
‘civilised’ states had to fulfil a number of requirements set by the European society of 
states in order to be recognised as full members states.20 Against this backdrop, the need 
for adjusting to Western style standards usually involved the introduction of alien values 
and norms to their culture, and, hence, the dilemma of how to balance traditional culture 
with modernity and reforms.21 It is in this context that the cases of Japan, China, Russia, 
and the Ottoman Empire have generated debates about their encounter with European 
international society and their struggle with the ‘standard of civilisation’.22 
   Nevertheless, it is worth noting that the process of recognition as a member of the 
expanding European international society was a good deal more complex. In particular, 
Japan is usually invoked as the first non-European state that met the ‘standard of 
civilisation’ and was successfully accepted as a member into international society.23 
However, the 1895 Triple Intervention by Russia, France, and Germany after the first 
Sino-Japanese War and the denial of racial equality clause by key Western powers at the 
 
20 Gong, The Standard of ‘Civilisation’. See also Antony Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making 
of International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); and Gerry J. Simpson, Great Powers 
and Outlaw States: Unequal Sovereigns in the International Legal Order (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2004), pp. 227-53. 
21 Gong, The Standard of ‘Civilisation’, pp. 6-14. 
22 Buzan, ‘The ‘Standard of Civilisation’’. 
23 Ibid, p. 583. 
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Paris Peace conference in 1919 are testimony to the tensions and contradictions that were 
central to the process of the ‘standard of civilisation’ as a universal process.24 After all, it 
is useful to remember that the European society of states was characterised by multiple 
layers of differentiation even among its members.25 
   Be that as it may, the point to emphasise here, for the purposes of this discussion, is that 
it is simply impossible to consider the emergence of the ‘standard of civilisation’ in the 
nineteenth century without recognising how a civilisation dimension was central to 
technological achievements in international relations in the context of the expansion of 
the European international society and how this process reinforced not only the sense of 
European superiority, but also the link between the state, technology, and modernity. It 
is here that contributions from the history and sociology of technology are potentially 
helpful in illuminating the wider historical context that defined the impact of scientific 
and technological accomplishments as a key feature of the expansion of the European 
international society. 
   Before considering that, however, a caveat should be noted. One of the most enduring 
and influential assumptions has been the centrality of science and technology in Western 
 
24 Tomoko T. Okagaki, The Logic of Conformity: Japan’s Entry into International Society (Toronto: 
Toronto University Press, 2013), p. 117; Gong, The Standard of ‘Civilisation’, pp. 63, 196-9. 
25 Simpson, Great Powers and Outlaw States; See also Edward Keene, ‘The Standard of ‘Civilisation’, the 
expansion thesis and the 19th-century international social space’, Millennium, 42:3 (2014), pp. 651-73.  
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civilisation and the ignorance of the sciences of other cultures, based on the idea of a 
Great Divide between the ‘scientific West’ and its ‘intuitive East’. This has culminated 
with an analytical property of a Eurocentric and hierarchical understanding of the 
relationship between science and civilisation, which often entails ‘comparisons of 
civilizations along normative teleologies of moral, political, scientific, or economic 
progress’.26 
   My intention, therefore, is not to advocate a Eurocentric conception of science and 
technology that seeks to deny Eastern agency from the global history of science and 
technology, but to try to understand and explain how notions of Western superiority and 
hierarchy based on the state of scientific and technological development have had 
profound implications in the context of the whole ‘standard of civilisation’ question, 
notwithstanding how discomforting their telling may be. Hence, it seems clear to me that 
trying to shed some light on a rather neglected aspect of the modern history of 
international society is not thereby endorsing it.  
     
 
Technological Advancement and Civilisational Hierarchies 
 
26 Roger Hart, Imagined Civilizations: China, the West, and Their First Encounter (Baltimore, MD: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 2013), p. 35.  
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One of the most important contributions that historically-informed analyses have made is 
in interrogating how science and technology were used by Western countries after the 
Industrial Revolution to establish a Western ideology that justified concepts of Western 
superiority, dominance, and colonialism as part of their ‘civilising mission’. In his 
seminal work on science and technology, Adas persuasively demonstrates how scientific 
and technological achievements became an indication of what it meant to be ‘civilised’.27 
Simply put, underpinning Western ideologies of dominance was the notion that scientific 
and technological accomplishments were markers of the level of civilisation a given 
society had achieved. Likewise, Daniel Headrick shows how technological advancements 
were a crucial factor in colonial expansion and empire-building,28 while Lewis Pyenson 
(1993) offers an account of how the spread of exact sciences to the colonies was a key 
element of the French ‘civilising mission’.29 
   More broadly, the origins of science and technology as representations of cultural 
authority can be traced back to the first phase of overseas expansion during the fifteenth 
 
27 Michael Adas, Machines as the Measure of Men: Science, Technology, and Ideologies of Western 
Dominance (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989).  
28 Daniel R. Headrick, The Tools of Empire: Technology and European Imperialism in the Nineteenth 
Century (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1981). 
29 Lewis Pyenson, Civilizing Mission: Exact Sciences and French Overseas Expansion, 1830-1940 
(Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press, 1993).  
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century. But although the role of scientific and technological accomplishments in 
influencing broader categorisations of non-European peoples as civilised or barbarian 
was relatively limited before the Industrial Revolution, from the 1780s onwards, 
machines gradually became emblems of the level of civilisation a given society had 
attained.30 A number of points are worth noting here. First, it is necessary to emphasise 
that technological innovation and gauges never assumed the formal status of legal, 
political, and diplomatic standards of the sort described in the relevant literature on the 
‘standard of civilisation’. Rather, technological feats served as an informal, but 
significant, marker of ordering polities along the stages of civilisation and progress.31 In 
this respect, technological advancement as an informal standard provided a framework 
for expectations about the proper place of science and technology within the context of 
state and modernity that indicated the differing levels of material and social development.  
    Second, one reason for thinking that technological achievements emerged as 
meaningful measures of human development, progress, and civilisation by the nineteenth 
century is because they could be empirically observed. Equally importantly, in addition 
to their function as physical and symbolic indicators of the superiority of European 
 
30 Adas, Machines, pp. 21-68. 
31 On a similar point with regards to the status of women as an informal ‘standard of civilisation’, see 
Towns, ‘The status of women’, p. 694. 
 
 
 
17 
colonial powers, technological attainments were also seen to embody a set of more subtle 
superior attributes, such as rationality, the mastery of time and space, precision, and 
discipline.32 This point is significant because it helps to illustrate how technology as a 
‘standard of civilisation’ was closely related to other standards associated with the same 
qualities of ‘civilised’ statehood, including the control of nature and the conduct of 
‘civilised’ warfare, as we saw previously, which were often blended into each other. 
   Third, the emergence of technological advancement as a standard contrasts with other 
competing conceptions and visions that emerged in the same period, revolving around the 
idea of science and technology as the unifier of humankind.33 This sort of internationalism 
was evident in the formation of the International Telecommunications Union, the world’s 
first intergovernmental organisation.34 But, their military uses aside, this did not prevent 
the telegraph, the railways, and other communications technologies to be simultaneously 
seen as ‘civilising’ forces.35 Besides, it was more often than not that the idea of the 
scientific community was exclusive, limited to the ‘civilised’ family of nations.36 What 
 
32 Adas, Machines, pp. 7, 224. 
33 Mark Mazower, Governing the World: The History of an Idea (London: Allen Lane, 2012), pp. 94-104. 
34 Douglas Howland, ‘An alternative mode of international order: The international administrative union in 
the nineteenth century’, Review of International Studies, 41:1 (2015), pp. 161-83. 
35 Ben Marsden and Crosbie Smith, Engineering Empires: A Cultural History of Technology in Nineteenth-
Century Britain (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), pp.  216, 231-2. See also Adas, Machines, pp. 
221-36. 
36 Geert J. Somsen, ‘A history of universalism: Conceptions of the internationality of science from the 
Enlightenment to the Cold War’, Minerva, 46 (2008): pp. 363-4. 
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should also be mentioned is that the construction of the ‘Other’ as ‘barbarous’ in terms 
of technology occurred even though ‘barbarous’ countries such as China and India had 
developed sophisticated technologies in the past, and despite the fact that the transnational 
flow of scientific knowledge and technological innovation meant that the relationship 
between Europe and the colonies was a two way street.37  
   Given this background, of particular significance here is the need to understand the 
representation of material achievements as a key element of the political ideology that 
imbued the political thought and public life in key colonising powers, such as Britain and 
France. While a detailed discussion of the quite different understandings of the 
relationship between technology and civilisation of that period is beyond the scope of this 
article, it is worth briefly considering some of the most influential works, especially those 
with a focus on China and India.  
     In this context, a wide range of European observers, authors, politicians, public 
officials, engineers, and travellers offered explicit accounts of the close synergy between 
technological accomplishments and civilisation, and their more subtle attributes, 
enmeshed in a techno-scientific orientalist discourse. Some of those came to draw 
conclusions about the level of Chinese and Indian civilisation by providing an extensive 
 
37 John M. Hobson, The Eastern Origins of Western Civilisation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2004). 
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account of their technological achievements in the nineteenth century. Of course, not 
everyone supported the idea that China and India should be evaluated and ranked as 
‘uncivilised’ on scientific and technological criteria, while some authors acknowledged 
the contributions of the Chinese and Indian civilisations to scientific knowledge and 
technological progress, at least in ancient times. Nevertheless, the views of influential 
authors, such as those of John Barrow and James Mill, are illustrative of the ways in 
which technological achievements were articulated as a measure to evaluate China and 
India as ‘uncivilised’.38 
   Barrow’s Travels in China had been an authoritative source on Chinese society and 
history since its publication in 1804.39 The book was the culmination of Barrow’s 
participation in the first British diplomatic mission to China, known as the Macartney 
Embassy, which travelled from Beijing to Guangzou in 1792 with the aim of improving 
trade with the Qing Empire. While Barrow recognises that China had once achieved a 
high level of civilisation in terms of social development and material culture, he offers a 
negative account of China’s perceived general backwardness in terms of technology and 
science.40 In discussing the use of Chinese tools and machines, Barrow notes that ‘the 
 
38 Adas, Machines, p. 10. 
39 John Barrow, Travels in China (London: T. Cadel and W. Davies, 1804). 
40 On Barrow’s background and the influence of his Travels in China, see Adas, Machines, pp. 178-83. 
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great advantages attainable from the use of mechanical powers are either not understood 
or, purposely, not employed’.41 Left unimpressed, Barrow concludes that, although ‘the 
Chinese have been among the first nations…to arrive at a certain pitch of 
perfection’…‘more than two thousand years ago, at a period when all Europe might be 
considered, comparatively, as barbarous’, ‘they have since made little progress in any 
thing, and been retrograde in many things’.42 While Travels in China did not receive the 
attention that Mill’s History of British India would do some years later, Barrow’s views 
and opinions about the level of Chinese scientific knowledge and technological 
innovation had an enduring impact on nineteenth century accounts of the Qing Empire 
and helped him to build a reputation as an authority on Chinese affairs.43  
    In a rather similar fashion, in his influential History of British India, Mill suggests that 
India has no mark of high civilisation because of the low state of scientific knowledge.44 
After a rather detailed analysis of the use of key tools and machines by Indians, Mill notes 
that:  
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Whoever, in the present improved state of our knowledge, shall take the trouble to 
contemplate the proofs which we possess of the state of knowledge and civilization 
among the Hindus, can form no other conclusion, but that every thing (unless 
astronomy be an exception) bears clear, concurring, and undeniable testimony to 
the ignorance of the Hindus, and the low state of civilization in which they remain.45  
 
Referring to ‘Surya Sidhanta’ as a proof of the contribution of Hindu civilisation to 
astronomical knowledge, Mill contends that ‘it is on the authority of our own countryman 
I am enabled to declare, that this book [Surya Sidharta] is itself the most satisfactory of 
all proofs of the low state of the science among the Hindus, and the rudeness of the people 
from whom it proceeds’ and he concludes that ‘the ignorance [of Hindus] of the present 
age is the same with the ignorance of all former ages’.46 Elsewhere in his History, citing 
Barrow’s Travels in China, Mill briefly analyses the use of machines and tools by Indians 
and Chinese to find that ‘in the contrivance and use of machinery both are equally simple 
and rude’.47  
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   The publication of History helped Mill to take a position with the East India Company, 
where he eventually took over the post of Examiner of India Correspondence. Although 
other works appeared soon after its publication that provided a more balanced account of 
Indian society and history, it is important to note that his views appear to have 
significantly influenced the policies of reformist British administrators in India, as his 
History came to be regarded as the definite source on India for future British rulers, 
traders, and missionaries. That candidates for the Indian Civil Service had to read History 
as part of their training is also illustrative of its authoritative status at that time.48 
    Not surprisingly, perhaps, non-European countries responded to their encounter with 
European international society during the nineteenth century in intrinsically different 
ways. Japan provides again the model of a country that successfully placed emphasis on 
technological and industrial development during the Meiji period in order to be seen as 
equal with and independent from the West.49 Notably, one of the consequences of Japan’s 
rapid technological and industrial transformation in its bid to be recognised as a ‘civilised’ 
great power was that it gradually posed a challenge to notions of Western superiority and 
hierarchy based on the state of its scientific and technological development. Arguably, as 
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noted earlier, Japan’s entry into international society was a thorny and ongoing process, 
but it seemed to confirm the earlier interest among Asian reformists in the universal nature 
of modernity. This possibility was nowhere clearer than in Japan’s stunning victory over 
Russia in 1904-5, which marked the first time that a non-European country had proved to 
be more mighty and modern than a European empire, albeit a weak one. The Russo-
Japanese War became a global moment of revaluating wide-held views about Western 
civilisation, colonial rule, and technological prowess, and reinforced the support among 
nationalists and intellectuals of China and India for equality with the West.50 
   Consequently, not only did the remarkable industrialisation of Japan over just a few 
decades demonstrate that it was a valuable model of modernisation for other Asian 
societies to follow, but it also put in question that the scientific and technological 
accomplishments of the Europeans were indicators of their racial superiority.51 Japan may 
be something of an extreme example with its emphasis on technological and industrial 
development. Still, the emergence of technological advancement as a measure of 
civilisation had an important impact on conceptions of technology in China and India in 
the long nineteenth century, to which I now turn.  
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China: The Pursuit of Technology and the ‘Standard of Civilisation’ 
 
Certainly, one of the most dramatic consequences of China’s violent encounter with the 
expanding European International Society was to bring about the realisation among 
Chinese elites that institutional reforms were needed in order to adapt to the new 
international environment. The most important attempt to modernise was what is usually 
known as the Self-Strengthening Movement with the aim to enhance China’s ‘wealth and 
strength’.52 In addition to the establishment of the Zongli yamen in 1861, an important 
institutional innovation intended to manage relations with major Western powers, there 
was also a growing appreciation of international law and diplomatic practices.53 
   It was this backdrop of internal tension and external pressure that provided the impetus 
for a shift towards the introduction of these reforms, including the adoption of Western 
technology, as part of the Qing restoration. There were a great many skilful officials who 
tried to contribute to the restoration of the empire by imbuing it with a sense of purpose, 
bolstering the faltering economy, and establishing innovative institutions, but Zeng 
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Guofan, Li Hongzhang, and Zuo Zongtang are usually considered as the most 
influential.54 What these influential reformers also shared in common was the view of the 
urgent need to pursue Western technology in the search for ‘wealth and strength’.55 
   More specifically, Zeng, Li, and their advisors saw the construction of machines not 
only in narrow military terms, but also as the fundamental basis for industry.56 
Significantly, key reformists, like Feng Guifen and Li, also saw the construction of 
Chinese machines as an indicator of China’s leading role in international society, as a 
way to right the wrongs of past humiliations, and as a source of prestige.57 Nowhere was 
this more evident than in the establishment of arsenals and shipyards, the most important 
of which were the Jiangnan Arsenal and the Fuzhou Navy Yard.58 But, among other 
factors, the prevailing conservatism and prejudice among Confucian literati and court 
officials hampered China’s path towards modernisation and industrialisation.59  
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   Yet the question remains about how to make sense of the impact of the pursuit of science 
and technology in late Qing Dynasty in the context of the operation of the ‘standard of 
civilisation’. In his important study on China and Japan’s encounter with the expanding 
European international society, Shogo Suzuki explores how military, technology, and 
industrial development were key aspects of what the process of learning the competence 
and skill to be a ‘civilised’ state involved.60 Crucially, however, as Suzuki observes, in 
contrast to Japanese elites who saw the introduction of Western technology as a key 
feature of demonstrating their ‘civilised’ identity, for Chinese elites industry and 
technology ‘served no value as a marker of ‘‘civilized’’ identity, as it did for the members 
of the Society’.61 
   One of Suzuki’s major contributions in this regard has been to recognise that Chinese 
elites did not go beyond the introduction of Western technology and weapons to adopt 
European-style institutions on a wide scale, which would indicate their intention to 
conform to the ‘standard of civilisation’. Instead, they only linked industrialisation and 
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Western technology to strengthening China militarily as a result of their socialisation into 
a competitive international environment.62  
   While Suzuki’s argument is interesting and important, however, it downplays the fact 
that a firm analytical separation between becoming militarily powerful and confirming to 
the social standards as part of what accorded ‘civilised’ status within international society 
has two substantial consequences. First, a focus on technology as a sole attribute of 
military power provides a rather superficial separation between the material and 
ideational or social dimensions of technology. Still, the author himself shows that Chinese 
reformers conceived technological modernisation in both military and non-military terms. 
Second, this tension seems to arise partly because the author accepts, albeit reluctantly, 
the ti/yong dichotomy, according to which late Qing reformers opted for military 
modernisation, but not Westernisation.63 Yet an uncritical acceptance of the ti/yong 
schema does not help to account for some of the attitudes towards science and technology 
that emerged in China as a consequence of its encounter with international society. 
   Plainly, many Chinese reformists who advocated the introduction of Western weapons 
and technology operated within what is known as the ti/yong dichotomy, an abbreviated 
form of the longer prescription to understand ‘Chinese studies as the essence, Western 
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studies as function’ (zhong xue wei ti, xi xue wei yong). In this regard, they called for the 
use of Western technology as functional means for Chinese ends, that is, the protection 
and preservation of Chinese civilisation.  Hence, underlying the thought of Self-
Strengthening supporters was the belief that ‘the “substance” (ti) of Confucian culture 
was essentially invulnerable to the “utility” (yong) of Western technology’.64 
   How then can we make sense of the fact that the views of Chinese reformist elites were 
seemingly more open-minded and multidimensional than the ti/yong dichotomy 
suggests? Christopher Hughes suggests that it makes more sense to treat the ti/yong 
dichotomy as a political act that can be traced back to the efforts by late Qing Dynasty 
officials ‘to mobilize the population by making tradition capable of harnessing the forces 
of nationalism’ during late nineteenth century China.65 This helps to illustrate the ways 
in which the advocates of the Self-Strengthening movement had to engage intellectually 
with the impact of transnational processes, unleashed by China’s encounter with global 
modernity, which involved drawing on neo-Confucian concepts as part of a process of 
syncretism.66 
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   In a similar vein, the use of the ti/yong formula by the Chinese reformists can also be 
seen as a political move to reconcile new conceptions of ‘Western science’ with 
traditional forms of knowledge and learning.67 In particular, since the mid-nineteenth 
century, the consolidation of the idea of a universal and teleological ‘Western science’ 
led Chinese reformists to resort to a further process of legitimisation and conceptual 
appropriation. This involved an attempt to encourage and reinterpret traditions and 
disciplines of knowledge that regarded China as the source of ‘Western learning’.68 This, 
in turn, had the effect of rendering the pursuit of ‘Western’ learning and technology more 
compatible with Confucian tradition and identity, and, thus, more acceptable to 
conservatives. The very fact that this position was held among imperial examiners until 
the early twentieth century is illustrative of how it was used by many conservatives as 
what Elman calls ‘a strategic myth’.69  
   Therefore, even if it is conceded that the ti/yong formula has some merit, it is important 
to recognise the complex nature of this process generally and the multidimensional nature 
of the views of Chinese reformists on the role of science and technology in particular. 
True, conservatism and ideology, among other factors, led to the limited and cautious 
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introduction of Western technology during the second half of the nineteenth century. In 
this respect, perceptions concerning a technology’s effects on internal and external 
security were also important.70 But the social pressure created by the need to conform to 
the operation of technological advancement as an informal ‘standard of civilisation’ was 
one of the key drivers behind China’s technological modernisation nonetheless.       
    Equally importantly, the Sino-Japanese War and its aftermath proved to be a turning 
point for China’s engagement with international society generally and science and 
technology in China in particular.  One of the most important consequences of the War 
was that it gave rise to references to Japan as a great power and as a member of the family 
of ‘civilised nations’, whereas perceptions of China as weak and decadent became 
prevalent.71 But what is also noteworthy is that the Sino-Japanese War had the effect of 
fostering a greater interest in Western learning and science.72  
   More broadly, in the years following the War, a series of events conspired to further 
destabilise what was already a volatile domestic political environment, which created in 
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turn the preconditions for the birth of the ‘modern’ Chinese state in 1911, ushering in the 
Republican era. Crucially, however, the broader question of the relationship between 
science and technology and China’s struggle with global modernity remained at the heart 
of subsequent events. Nowhere was this more apparent than in the May Fourth 
Movement. Indeed, an important feature of the movement was the degree to which many 
intellectuals espoused a complete break with Confucianism and Chinese tradition in 
favour for an embrace of modernisation or Westernisation in all key facets of Chinese 
culture, from literature and ethics to philosophy and politics.73 
   Significantly, as Rana Mitter points out, ‘a faith in science and technology, linked with 
ideas of national salvation and reform’, appeared to many to be the solution to China’s 
manifold problems.74 Equally, the key underlying assumption behind advocating the 
creation of a new, modern civilisation to ‘save China’ was the idea that science and 
democracy constituted the essence of modern Western civilisation, which was evident in 
the famous slogans of ‘Mr Science’ and ‘Mr Democracy’.75  It was in this context that a 
new generation of scientists and engineers, many of whom were educated abroad, aspired 
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to save China through science and technology.76 Part of this gradual metamorphosis was 
also the growing importance of industrial development over other sectors of the economy 
in order to turn China into a modern, industrial, and technologically advanced country 
under the government of Chiang Kai-shek.77 
   Consequently, the most general point to make is that the fundamental interaction 
between the state, power, and technological hierarchies in international society, which 
was at the heart of late Qing reformists and Republican China, would continue to shape 
conceptions about the role of science and technology in Communist China, as I shall 
discuss later.  
 
 
India, Modernity, and the Making of the Postcolonial Technological State 
    
The importance of the close links between science, technology, and colonial rule in 
British India has attracted much attention in the scholarly literature that deals with the 
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social history of science and technology in India.78 As many have noted, the British saw 
science and technology as important features of their ‘civilising mission’ as well as a 
manifestation of their superior civilisation.79 A detailed account of science, technology, 
colonialism and modernity in the context of the British Empire and its impact on India is 
beyond the scope of this article, but some of the key aspects of this process are worth 
highlighting here. First, the period of British rule in India witnessed the effort by the 
colonisers to ‘enlighten’ the natives through science as a source of reason, which had the 
effect of positioning the function of science both as culture and power. In this regard, the 
very idea of Western modernity was embedded in the scientific outlook of the colonial 
and imperial project in the sense that the authority and legitimacy of universal reason 
signified science and technology as tools of the British rule in India.80 
   Second, an important feature of the projection of India as a modern colony was the 
development of infrastructures, practices, and institutions associated with the 
representation of science and technology as configurations of Western authority and 
universal reason. This was manifested in the ways in which the colonial state used modern 
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techniques of governmentality from irrigation and mining to the railways and the 
telegraph system.81 Indeed, for Marquis of Dalhousie, who was Governor-General of 
India from 1848 to 1856, the telegraph and the postal system represented the two of the 
three ‘great engines of social improvement’ of colonial India. In his view, the third engine 
was the establishment of a network of railways, which increasingly epitomised the moral 
and material superiority of the coloniser over the colonised.82 However, it should be noted 
that this process was further consolidated after the 1857 Mutiny that placed India under 
direct Crown rule. Against the backdrop of further centralisation and tightening colonial 
control, the development of science and technology became one of the largest state-
sponsored undertakings under the Public Works Department.83  
   Third, the hierarchy of civilisations according to material accomplishments was also 
reflected in the reproduction of social hierarchies between the coloniser and the colonised. 
Not only was the Indian civilisation defined as stagnant and backward, but the Indian 
worker had to be subordinated to the British engineer ‘as civiliser’.84 Equally, as Daniel 
Headrick observes, the British were willing to upskill the Indians only to a certain point, 
 
81 Ibid, pp. 11, 159-70.  
82 Daniel R. Headrick, The Tentacles of Progress: Technology Transfer in the Age of Imperialism, 1850-
1940 (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1988), p. 64; Adas, Machines, pp. 223, 225. 
83 Zaheer Baber, The Science of Empire: Scientific Knowledge, Civilization, and Colonial Rule in India, 
(Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1996), pp. 184-212; Prakash, Another Reason, p. 4. 
84 Adas, Machines, pp. 235-6. 
 
 
 
35 
beyond which ‘they withheld the culture of technology’.85 Yet although the consolidation 
of colonial rule in India led to the development of colonial structures that facilitated the 
institutionalisation of Western scientific research and technological projects, which had 
a decisive impact on the indigenous system of science, Indian scientists were key agents 
in promoting the introduction of Western science and technology. In other words, it is 
important to acknowledge that the introduction of Western science and technology in 
India cannot be understood as a simple process of imposing Western traditions of 
knowledge on indigenous ones.86 
    As a result, during the second half of the nineteenth century an Indian scientific elite 
emerged that could identify with the project of Western modernity. A key aspect of this 
effort was the creation of institutions like the Indian Association for the Cultivation of 
Science, which was formally established in 1876 with the aim of educating Indian 
scientists on basic research under native control and management. Notably, one of its 
students, C V Raman, would become the first Indian to be awarded the Nobel Prize for 
theoretical physics in 1930.87  
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   But what merits emphasis is that the embracement of modernity by the Indian scientific 
community became gradually interwoven with the rise of nationalism, which marked the 
growing intersection of science and politics. As Gyan Prakash argues, it became 
increasingly accepted among anti-colonial nationalists that ‘to be a nation was to be 
endowed with science’.88 This involved the ‘rediscovery’ of a body of indigenous 
scientific traditions that was appropriated as congruous with Western science. 
Concomitant with this was a process of conceptual appropriation based on the idea that 
these traditions of science, technology, and knowledge were the past of the Indian nation, 
imbued with universal thought and rationality. It was in this context that Hindu science 
soon emerged as ‘symbol for the modern nation’ and as a way to indigenise modernity. 
In turn, the claim by nationalists that Hindu science was an expression of universality and 
rationality reconfigured the colonial state defined by modern techniques, practices, and 
infrastructures as a national site that had to become independent.89  
   As a consequence, not only was science at the heart of the imagination and institution 
of India as a colonial project, but also became essential in the reconstruction of India as 
an independent nation. This was evident in the widely held assumption among nationalists 
that India succumbed to colonial rule because it did not manage to become modern. In 
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their view, as Priya Chacko notes, it was India’s failure to develop a scientific outlook, 
and thus, to meet the ‘standard of civilisation’ set by the European international society 
that brought India under British control.90 Indeed, in the postcolonial world the 
development of a scientific outlook emerged as an indicator of national character 
predicated on the idea that the nexus between modern science and the nation-state was a 
key factor in the making of the dominant European powers. In response, postcolonial 
states felt compelled to adapt and imitate these practices.91  
   The colonial experience, therefore, led to the conviction that India was backward, which 
in turn gave rise to the desire of mimicking ‘Western’ practices, including science and 
technology. But whereas the increasing acceptance of modernity among Indian elites was 
seen as an inescapable process of the emerging international order, given the country’s 
colonial past, India’s response to modernity could not be underpinned by simple mimicry. 
India had to foster a different modernity ‘on its own terms’.92 Put differently, the mimicry 
of Western modernity had to be counterbalanced with ambivalence towards Western 
modernity in order to highlight India’s difference as a postcolonial civilisational entity.93 
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That said, the key point to emphasise is that technological advancement as a civilisational 
standard in the long nineteenth century was implicated in the emergence of a powerful 
postcolonial ideology of science and technology under the leadership of Nehru that 
signified the pursuit of key technological projects as normative indicators of the 
postcolonial state’s power, status, and modernity, as I explain below.   
 
Civilisation, Modernity, and Technological Hierarchies  
 
In recent years, there has been a growing body of literature that seeks to illustrate the 
ways in which the logic of the ‘standard of civilisation’ resonates today, reflected mainly 
in certain liberal norms, principles, and practices, what David Fidler calls the ‘standard 
of liberal, globalized civilization’.94 These include, but are not limited to, the following: 
human rights95; economic and financial standards96; the status of women97; democratic 
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government98; the European Union’s membership conditionality and other policies99 and 
non-proliferation, arms control, and the conduct of warfare.100 This has been evident, of 
course, in the generation of new categories of outsiders to the liberal structure of 
international society, such as ‘rogue’, ‘failed’, ‘pariah’, and ‘outlaw’ states.101  
   In this context, non-European countries continue to face the same dilemmas of how to 
respond to the challenges of modernisation, development, and globalisation. As Gerrit 
Gong notes, ‘one cannot speak of “modernization”, or the “process of becoming modern”, 
in a historical perspective without referring to what an earlier age called “civilization” 
and the process of becoming “civilized”’.102 This is an important consideration, for the 
purposes of this article, especially given how Chinese and Indian elites continue to 
struggle with the stigmas of ‘[n]ot being of the “West”, being behind the “West”, not 
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being “modern” enough, not being developed or industrialized or secular or civilized or 
Christian or democratic enough’.103 
   Not surprisingly, therefore, China has attracted much attention in the scholarly literature 
that deals with its engagement with present civilisational standards that underpin the 
current normative structure of international society.104 Unlike China, however, India’s 
encounter story has been largely neglected presumably because it appears as a somewhat 
straightforward case. India initially succumbs to colonial rule so its struggle with 
modernity is understood as part of the broader issue pertaining to the relationship of ruler 
and ruled.105 
    Be that as it may, by the early twentieth century the tendency among states to cast 
technological achievements as markers of modernity was already consolidated. Indeed, 
as Harrison and Johnson observe, ‘the first states to take advantage of the power this 
nexus [between science and the nation-state] produced became globally dominant and 
were widely imitated’.106 For example, despite the significant differences between British 
and German understandings of the national importance of technology, the Anglo-German 
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political and economic competition of that period helped to cultivate a culture of 
modernity that was conductive to technological innovation, engrained in a sense of 
national purpose. This led observers in Britain and Germany to see passenger ships, 
civilian vessels, and airships as indicators of their countries’ international status and 
national prestige that exhibited a country’s creative potential, international leadership, 
and national aspirations.107 
   To be sure, the first and the second World Wars have had a profound impact on the 
discourse of civilisation and notions of European superiority over non-European 
societies.108 Yet the same cannot be said about the role of technology as an informal 
standard of modernity and hierarchy in international society. At a time when the erstwhile 
European powers were trying to recover from the devastating consequences of the two 
wars, technological development was increasingly becoming a key aspect of the growing 
influence of the United States and the Soviet Union as an indicator of national purpose, 
international status, and global aspirations amid the Cold War. However, it should be 
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noted that one of the most important consequence of the Cold War was that it redefined 
the nexus between techno-scientific practices and the nation-state globally.109 
   Concomitant with this process was the reworking of the relationship between 
technology and the state in the context of modernisation. As was mentioned previously, 
in many ways, modernisation, as a term associated with different levels of human worth, 
came to supplant previous ideas about civilisation and technological accomplishments.110 
Consequently, as Brett Bowden (2009: 186) notes, the ‘efficacy of science and 
technology’ can be understood as one of a number of criteria that states need to meet in 
order to be recognised as full members of international society in the twenty-first 
century.111 What is more, as Barry Buzan and George Lawson point out, contemporary 
attempts at restricting the spread of advanced weapons, including nuclear weapons and 
missile technology, to the periphery of international society is reflective of the nineteenth 
century colonial pattern of demarcating the ‘civilised’ at home and the ‘barbaric’ 
abroad.112  
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    Therefore, highly visible technological projects, such as nuclear and space 
programmes, have continued to provide a substitute for a mechanism of exclusion in 
international society as normative symbols of modernity, progress, and technological 
prowess, especially from 1945 onwards. This has had the effect of reproducing the 
distinction between insiders and outsiders based on the possession of specific 
technologies as an institutionalised, but informal form of hierarchy in international 
society. A number of points are worth noting here. First, scholars have highlighted the 
ways in which the advent of the Nuclear Age signified a global condition that defined 
nuclear power as a new form of reproducing insiders and outsiders interwoven with what 
Hugh Gusterson has called ‘nuclear orientalism’.113 This has been epitomised by the 
distinction between the nuclear ‘Haves’ and the ‘Have Nots’.114 In addition, useful 
accounts of cases concerning the intersection of technology, modernity, national identity, 
culture, and state-building have also been provided.115  
 
113 Hugh Gusterson, ‘Nuclear weapons and the Other in the Western imagination’, Cultural Anthropology, 
14:1 (1999), pp. 111-43. 
114 Shampa Biswas, Nuclear Desire: Power and the Postcolonial Nuclear Order (Minneapolis, MN: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2014). 
115 See, for example, Peter Fritzsche, A Nation of Fliers: German Aviation and the Popular Imagination 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992); Gabrielle Hecht, The Radiance of France: Nuclear 
Power and National Identity after World War II (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2009); Timothy Mitchell, Rule 
by Experts: Egypt, Techno-politics, Modernity (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2002). 
 
 
 
44 
   Second, as far as China is concerned, scholarly analysis has focused on how a powerful 
and composite techno-nationalist ideology has informed, and continues to inform, the 
pursuit of key technological projects, including nuclear, missile, and space projects,116 as 
part of China’s enduring quest for wealth and power.117 Crucially, the origins of Chinese 
techno-nationalism can be traced to China’s formative experience with the European 
international society in the nineteenth century.118 This serves to highlight the relationship 
between technological prowess and civilisational hierarchies. As Benjamin Elman (2007: 
523), a leading historian of science and technology in China, observes:  
 
If there has been one constant in China since the middle of the nineteenth century, 
it is that imperial reformers, early Republicans, and Chinese Communists have all 
prioritized modern science and technology. We can no longer afford to undervalue 
the place of science in modern contemporary China. China’s plans to send space 
 
116 Evan A. Feigenbaum, China’s Techno-Warriors: National Security and Strategic Competition from the 
Nuclear to the Information Age (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003); and Tai Ming Cheung, 
Fortifying China: The Struggle to Build a Modern Defense Economy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 
2009), pp. 237-41. For an insightful analysis of the importance of Chinese techno-nationalism as a 
composite ideology, see Christopher R. Hughes, Chinese Nationalism in the Global Era (Abingdon: 
Routledge, 2006). On the original use of the concept of techno-nationalism, see Richard J. Samuels, Rich 
Nation, Strong Army: National Security and the Technological Transformation of Japan (Ithaca, NY : 
Cornel University Press, 1994).  
117 On China’s continuing quest for wealth and power, see Orville Schell and John Delury, Wealth and 
Power: China’s Long March to the Twenty-First Century (London: Little, Brown, 2013).  
118 Feigenbaum, China’s Techno-Warriors, pp.  225-7; Tai Ming Cheung, Fortifying China, p. 237. 
 
 
 
45 
expeditions to the moon and Mars in the twenty-first century are in part a response 
to the shock of heavy-handed Western and Japanese imperialism since 1850.119 
 
Third, with regards to India, there has been a growing interest in key science and 
technology projects as an important aspect of the intersection of India’s national identity 
and state-building since independence.120 Part of this debate has also been a focus on how 
high-prestige projects, such as India’s nuclear programme, have become an embedded 
practice of its postcolonial identity and ‘civilisational exceptionalism’, signifying 
national techno-social and techno-political projects as markers of power, status, and 
modernity.121 Likewise, recent works have showed the ways in which India’s space effort 
has been couched in the language of modernisation and progress in a postcolonial 
context.122 
    In light of the above, the key point that emerges from this brief discussion is that it is 
necessary to take into consideration the ways in which technological advancement was 
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seen as an informal ‘standard of civilisation’ in the nineteenth century, if we want to 
understand the continuing influence of conceptions of technology associated with 
prestige, status, and national identity in the current international order. A focus on China 
and India helps to illustrate this. Not only did the emergence of technological 
advancement as a civilisational standard have an impact on the pursuit of technology in 
China and India during the long nineteenth century, but the logic of this standard remains 
entrenched in certain Chinese and Indian techno-scientific projects that remake 
technological hierarchies within today’s international society.  
 
 
Concluding Remarks  
 
Engaging with Science and Technology Studies (STS), recent IR scholarship has brought 
attention to the study of the politics of technology by highlighting the ways in which 
technology is socially constructed in global politics. This is a welcome contribution to 
our understanding of the increasingly complex interplay between technology and the 
international, not least because it helps us to move beyond technological determinism and 
ahistoricism that have characterised much of the contemporary IR literature that deals 
with technology. However, in this article I have argued that this emerging body of 
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scholarship misses certain aspects of how technology is shaped by international society. 
What we need, therefore, is to adopt a new thinking about the global politics of 
technology that relates technology with international society.  
    In pursuing this line of enquiry, I have outlined one way through which international 
society has influenced technology by considering the emergence of technological 
advancement as a ‘standard of civilisation’ in the nineteenth century. As I have shown, 
an important feature of the expansion of the European society of states into the non-
European world was the social construction of technological advancement as a 
civilisational standard that differentiated the ‘society of civilised states’ from non-
European societies, with a particular focus on China and India. This process was 
becoming enmeshed in a techno-scientific orientalist discourse that engendered 
hierarchical conceptions of modern science and technology, which went hand in hand 
with the construction of civilisational hierarchies and other standards of ‘civilisation’, by 
each feeding into the other. To further illustrate that point, the article has considered the 
ways in which the emergence of technological advancement as a ‘standard of civilisation’ 
had an important and enduring impact on Chinese and Indian conceptions of science and 
technology as part of their engagement with international society.  
      The emergence of technological advancement as a ‘standard of civilisation’ in the 
nineteenth century has important implications for today’s international society. Although 
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the first and the second World Wars have had a profound effect on the discourse of 
civilisation and notions of European superiority over non-European societies, sites of 
inclusion and exclusion on the basis of technological capabilities continued, and still 
continue, to define distinctions between outsiders and insiders and, thus, forms of 
hierarchy, power, and status in international society. Therefore, considering technology 
as a civilisational standard helps to illustrate how China and India’s formative experience 
with the European international society still informs a powerful variant of techno-
nationalism, associated with high-profile engineering projects, such as nuclear and space 
programmes. This becomes an important consideration, especially given how China and 
India remain enmeshed in a process of negotiating their role as non-Western emerging 
technological powers in the context of modernisation, development, and globalisation.  
    In closing, it is important to emphasise that bringing technology into international 
society should be seen as a complementary move that can be extended further to 
incorporate principal insights from the burgeoning STS-IR literature. In this context, 
rather than focusing on how technology affects global politics or how international 
society influences technology, it is worth considering how the English School and STS 
can complement the other as part of an effort to examine the co-constitution and co-
implication of technology and international society. This can also involve an analysis that 
relates technology with other aspects of the research agenda of the English School, such 
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as the study of primary institutions (the balance of power, great power management, 
diplomacy, sovereignty, law, war, the market, and so on).123 A key question then is how 
the primary institutions of international society enable and constrain the development of 
technology and how technology introduces changes into the primary institutions. It 
should also be noted that the cases of China and India are by no means exhaustive. 
Therefore, it is worth considering other cases of state and non-state actors and processes 
and what these can tell us about technology and international society. In light of the 
above, the argument put forward in this article helps to open new avenues for exploring 
the growing dynamics of technology and global politics, on which future theoretical and 
empirical work will hopefully build.  
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